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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The year is 2021.  Meeting people, dating, and talking to people online is 
not as frowned upon as it was years ago.  Many find meeting others online—
either for friendship or romantic relationships—is more convenient and less 
time-consuming than venturing into the real world for these initial 
connections.  But with technology allowing people to hide behind screens, 
avoid face-to-face confrontation, and even remain completely anonymous, 
some take advantage and send out unsolicited visual material which would 
annoy or appall most people.  Indecent exposure has essentially transferred 
online in the form of these unsolicited visual materials, and there has not 
been a Texas law to combat and deter these unwanted advances until Texas 
House Bill 2789 (H.B. 2789),1 now codified as Texas Penal Code 
 
1. Bill: HB 2789, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE (Jun. 10, 2019), https://capitol.texas.gov/ 
BillLookup/Text.aspx?LegSess=86R&Bill=HB2789 [https://perma.cc/P6HX-WDEJ] [hereinafter 
Bill: HB 2789] (click the “Text” tab and follow one of the links to the PDF or Word versions of the 
bill and enrolled act). 
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Ann. Section 21.19 (“TPC Section 21.19” or “the Code”).2  Although the 
First Amendment allows leniency in government regulation,3 Texas has not 
used this to its advantage to prevent these types of messages beforehand.  
H.B. 2789 was written as a safeguard for those who do not wish to receive 
these unsolicited visuals.4  While laws exist to prohibit this conduct in some 
forms, including in-person indecent exposure5 and online harassment when 
recipients can prove the sender intended to annoy or harass them,6 the 
recent issue of deterring these types of instances online remains.  Texas is 
one of the first states to introduce a bill to do so.  The Texas Legislature 
drafted H.B. 2789 as a response to this existing issue, aiming to stop those 
who wish to expose themselves to unwilling participants online. 
Part II of this Comment will discuss the substantial issues within TPC 
Section 21.19, outline the trend of regulating the First Amendment in the 
U.S., and discuss where the remaining gaps leave us in protecting against 
online sexual advances.  Part III will present arguments as to why TPC 
Section 21.19 will be declared unconstitutional.  Part IV will examine 
underlying issues such as enforceability and potential claims of mistake 
under TPC Section 21.19.  Finally, Part V compares and contrasts TPC 
Section 21.19 with a similar Texas statute. 
II.    OVERVIEW 
TPC Section 21.19 took effect on September 1, 2019.7  As a result, those 
who transmit sexually explicit visual material without the expressed consent 
or request of the recipient could be charged with a Class C misdemeanor 
and a maximum fine of $500.8  Under the new law, anyone who knowingly 
 
2. Throughout this Comment, H.B. 2789 and TPC Section 21.19 may be used interchangeably 
to refer to the former bill and now law. 
3. See generally Ronald Steiner, Compelling State Interest, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/31/compelling-state-interest [https://perma.cc/C2 
GS-L55N] (providing an overview of the different levels of governmental scrutiny). 
4. Bill: HB 2789, supra note 1 (“AN ACT relating to the creation of the criminal offense of 
unlawful electronic transmission of sexually explicit visual material.”). 
5. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08 (providing the portion of the Code entitled “Indecent 
Exposure”). 
6. See id. § 42.07(a) (“A person commits an offense if, with intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, 
torment, or embarrass another, the person: (1) initiates communication and in the course of the 
communication makes a comment, request, suggestion, or proposal that is obscene . . . .”). 
7. See Bill: HB 2789, supra note 1 (providing information on H.B. 2789, including passage date, 
voting history, and authors). 
8.  House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2789, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019), https://hro. 
house.texas.gov/pdf/ba86R/HB2789.PDF [https://perma.cc/9939-DV8U]. 
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transmits visual material depicting “any person engaged in sexual conduct 
or with the person’s intimate parts exposed; or covered genitals of a male 
person that were in a discernibly turgid state” could be held criminally 
liable.9  
On its face, TPC Section 21.19 looks like a legislative victory protecting 
people from digital sexual harassment and preserving the morals of our 
community, but there may be issues lingering in the shadows of this 
seemingly positive law.10  The passing of this bill fills a void in Texas law—
holding those who send unwanted sexually explicit pictures online 
accountable—and the good intentions behind it led to the initial celebration 
of the bill’s passing.11  During Senate and House committee hearings, 
proponents explained that although indecent exposure is a crime, the same 
act committed over texting or a dating app leaves the recipient without 
recourse, even for repetitive offenses.12  Proponents want exhibitionists to 
unwilling participants to receive criminal punishment just as they would in 
person.13  Proponents also claimed this bill was needed now more than 
ever, as our culture of meeting others, making friends, dating, and how we 
live our day-to-day lives has changed drastically in recent years, moving 
 
9. Id. 
10. See generally Anabel Pasarow, Sending Unsolicited Nude Photos Isn’t Illegal.  Bumble’s CEO  
Wants to Change That, REFINERY29: TECH (Aug. 27, 2019, 4:10 PM), https://www.refinery29. 
com/en-us/2019/08/241624/bumble-ceo-sexual-harassment-law [https://perma.cc/R953-5KVD] 
(describing the bill and how it does not intend to curtail free expression, but intends the “standards of 
acceptable behavior in the digital world to match the standards that apply in real life”). 
11. See HB 2789, 86th Regular Session, LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR. TEXAS, https://lrl.texas.gov/ 
legis/billsearch/JournalsEtc.cfm?legSession=86-0&billtypeDetail=HB&billNumberDetail=2789&bill 
SuffixDetail= [https://perma.cc/RXP2-KSJA] [hereinafter HB 2789, 86th Regular Session] (click the 
“Online Recordings” link for “House hearings and debates [which] are available for the 86th Regular 
Session,” scroll down and click the “86th Session” link, then click the “Criminal Jurisprudence” link in 
the March 25, 2019 row) (providing an online recording of the March 25, 2019 proceeding of the 
Criminal Jurisprudence Committee of the Texas House of Representatives where bill author 
Rep. Morgan Meyer, R-Dallas, said this bill would be “filling the void where Texas laws are currently 
silent”); see also Senate Committee on State Affairs (Part I), TEX. SENATE (May 9, 2019), 
https://tlcsenate.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=45&clip_id=14468 [https://perma.cc/ 
QKL9-9R3P] [hereinafter Senate Committee on State Affairs (Part I)] (recording the Senate Committee on 
State Affairs Part I, eliciting witness testimony from Senator Joan Huffman, among others). 
12. HB 2789, 86th Regular Session, supra note 11. 
13. See id. (providing a recording of the March 25, 2019 Criminal Jurisprudence Committee of 
the Texas House of Representatives proceeding where proponent Whitney Wolfe Herd proposed 
online exhibitionists should still face consequences as in-person offenders do); see also Senate Committee 
on State Affairs (Part I), supra note 11 (providing Part I of the Senate Committee on State Affairs 
recording, including witness testimony from Senator Joan Huffman, among others, explaining the 
desire to hold offenders accountable). 
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those connections online without much-needed protection following.14  
Proponents in favor of the bill testified they themselves had been victims of 
unwanted sexually explicit photos and expressed concern about children 
possibly being exposed to the same kind of obscenity when they use their 
parents’ phones.15  It is also common for young children to have their own 
phones, and this bill gives parents peace of mind knowing there is extra 
protection for their children—even when supervised.16  Proponents also 
made it known they did not want to over-criminalize the offenders, 
proposing an accompanying Class C misdemeanor punishment as opposed 
to the more harsh Class B misdemeanor accompanying indecent 
exposure.17  If found guilty of breaking this new law, the individual shall be 
punished by a fine not to exceed $500,18 as opposed to the punishment for 
indecent exposure: a fine not exceeding $2,000, confinement in jail for a 
term not to exceed 180 days, or both.19  
Although no one expressed disfavor in any of the public hearings on the 
bill,20 there were ten “nays” in the final House vote after reviewing 
statements of vote.21  Non-legislative opponents, including Texas attorneys, 
have mentioned enforcement of the law could be challenging due to a 
 
14. Senate Committee on State Affairs (Part I), supra note 11 (providing the Senate Committee on 
State Affairs Part I recording, including witness testimony from Senator Joan Huffman and 
Whitney Herd speaking about the advances in technology). 
15. Id. (providing the Senate Committee on State Affairs Part I recording, recording with 
witness testimony from proponent Brandy Davis speaking on her personal experience with receiving 
sexually explicit photos without asking for them.). 
16. Kids Cell Phone Use Survey 2019—Truth About Kids & Phones., SELLCELL (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.sellcell.com/blog/kids-cell-phone-use-survey-2019/ [https://perma.cc/DG36-D9RS] 
(“40% of US parents let their kids have their own phone by the age of 10.  65% of pre-teenage kids 
have a phone by the time they reach 13.”). 
17. HB 2789, 86th Regular Session, supra note 11 (providing the recording of the March 25, 2019 
Criminal Jurisprudence Committee of the Texas House of Representatives proceeding where Texas 
Representative Joe Moody discussed the bill with Whitney Herd explaining punishment for offenders 
found guilty of violating H.B. 2789). 
18. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.23. 
19. Id. § 12.22. 
20. See Senate Committee on State Affairs (Part I), supra note 11 (providing the Senate Committee 
on State Affairs Part I recording of public hearing with no opponent on the bill speaking); see also 
HB 2789, 86th Regular Session, supra note 11 (providing the recording of the March 25, 2019 Criminal 
Jurisprudence Committee of the Texas House of Representatives public hearing with no opponent on 
the bill speaking). 
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staggering volume of people affected and limited resources.22  Others have 
speculated there may be evidentiary issues in certain circumstances, such as 
when the sender denies sending the message.23  These are very real and 
common issues arising in cases in which a party wishes to introduce any kind 
of text or online message during trial—evidence often creating costly and 
painful delays for victims.24   
For example, in order to hold an alleged sender liable for the sexually 
explicit picture sent to a plaintiff, the plaintiff must establish the alleged 
sender is indeed the offender.25  Although establishing originating cell 
phone ownership is insufficient, the requirements of authentication are not 
particularly demanding and depend on a case-by-case basis whether the texts 
contain identifying information.26  In certain circumstances, the sexually 
explicit material may be “distinctive” enough for the trier of fact to deem it 
authentic,27 but, in others, parties may need to go to greater lengths to 
authenticate.28  Even after confirming sexually explicit messages came from 
the accused individual’s account, some cases will still go unresolved due to 
the plaintiff’s inability to meet their evidentiary burden to show the 
 
22. Troy Closson, A New Texas Law Criminalizes Sending Unwanted Nudes.  Lawyers Say It Might Be 
Difficult to Enforce., TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 14, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2019/08/14/Texas-new-law-sending-unwanted-nudes-dating-apps-texts/ [https://perma.cc/E9ZG-
XRH7] (discussing TPC § 21.19, the punishment for breaking the law, the possible repercussions, and 
the possible difficulty of enforcing the law). 
23. Id. (“J.T. Morris, an Austin-based attorney whose firm specializes in First Amendment 
rights, said difficulties may also arise if an accused sender claims he or she wasn’t the one who sent a 
lewd message.”). 
24. See generally Pierre Grosdidier, Authentication of Cell Phone Text Messages, ST. B. OF TEX.: 
COMPUTER & TECH. SEC. 8, 8 (2016), http://sbot.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Authen 
tication-of-Cell-Phone-Text-Messages.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2K5-T75H] (explaining the challenges 
of and solutions to authenticating text messages to use them as evidence in court). 
25. See id. (“Authenticating cell phone text message authorship requires something more than 
establishing originating cell phone ownership.”). 
26. See id. (explaining how simply knowing a message came from a particular phone number is 
not enough to prove the owner of the phone actually sent it); see also TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) (providing 
examples of evidence satisfying the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence: 
“Distinctive Characteristics and the Like”). 
27. DAVID A. SCHLUETER & JONATHAN D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL 1017 (10th ed. 2015). 
28. Sennett v. State, 406 S.W.3d 661, 669 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (elucidating the 
authentication process of emails between the victim and defendant, including introduction of (1) the 
testimony of the victim and victim’s mother regarding their familiarity with defendant’s email address, 
and (2) the contents of the responsive emails concerning matters only the victim and defendant would 
have known). 
6
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 1, Art. 6
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss1/6
  
2020] COMMENT 193 
individual is the one who clicked “send.”29  Other opponents believe the 
bill is overly broad, suggesting even emailing a doctor an image for medical 
purposes could be considered criminal acts under the law, leading to 
unintended prosecutions.30  Many expect the bill to be challenged in court 
based on the concerns raised by opponents.31 
A. Substantial Issues with Texas Penal Code Section 21.19 
While there should be protection for those who do not want to receive 
unrequested sexually explicit materials online, TPC Section 21.19 is not the 
proper way to ensure these protections.  Although the bill was intended to 
fill a much-needed gap in Texas law, its extremely broad and vague language 
leaves it unconstitutional on its face.  Undefined statutory language may also 
cause confusion.  Several terms within the Code remain ambiguous, which 
could lead to misapplication of the law.  First, although the bill proponents 
suggested the word “person” means a human being in real time,32 there is 
no ready indicator within the law excluding drawings, sculptures, paintings, 
and other images of people, which could cause confusion.  Further, it bans 
visual materials simply including the exposed person’s intimate parts,33 
which is unconstitutionally too broad for states to regulate under Miller v. 
California.34  Finally, the law requires explicit visual materials only be sent at 
 
29. An article by Rebekah Allen discussed an investigation by the University of Texas into a 
Texas senator who denied sending explicit, unwanted photos to a student although they came from his 
account—claiming a third party with his account information sent them.  This was after members of 
the senator’s staff followed up with the student after he initially contacted her on LinkedIn regarding 
what they had spoken about.  This was the same LinkedIn account later used to reference inappropriate 
text messages sent to the student from a phone number written on the senator’s legislative business 
card.  See generally Rebekah Allen, ‘Send a Pic?’ UT Concludes Investigation, Releases Messages Texas Senator 
Allegedly Sent Student., DALL. MORNING NEWS (Dec. 18, 2018, 6:12 PM), https://www.dallas 
news.com/news/politics/2018/12/19/send-a-pic-ut-concludes-investigation-releases-messages-texas 
-senator-allegedly-sent-student/ [https://perma.cc/N9KA-M4KK]. 
30. Closson, supra note 22 (discussing H.B. 2789 and possible repercussions). 
31. See id. (“David Anderson, a former UT Austin law professor who focuses on free speech, 
expects legal challenges to the law”); Voicemail Message: Office of Drew Springer, Texas House of 
Representatives (Nov. 2019) (on file with author) (recording a direct response to inquiry on why 
Representative Springer voted “nay” on Bill 2789: the office expects the law to be challenged in court).  
32. Senate Committee on State Affairs (Part I), supra note 11 (providing the Senate Committee on 
State Affairs (Part I) recording with witness testimony stating they want to prevent unwanted sexual 
pictures from others). 
33. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19. 
34. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973) (holding material may be subject to state 
regulation where the work, as a whole: “(a) . . . appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) . . . is patently 
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or 
7
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the request of, or with the express consent of, the recipient,35 but does not 
give direction as to what constitutes “express consent.” 
When legislation is proposed, there is ample consideration in order to 
ensure the writing encompasses the intent of the author and also to ensure 
those who analyze it—including parties in both the House and Senate—
consider other potential issues and misinterpretations.36  Although the 
author of H.B. 2789 wrote with the intent to protect people from 
harassment,37 the bill would have benefitted from additional revision, as the 
lack thereof has left it facially unconstitutional.38   
B. Not All Speech Is Free Speech—The Historical Trend of Regulating the 
First Amendment 
1. Obscenity and Indecency Regulations Leading up to the 
21st Century 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects several 
basic freedoms, including freedoms of religion, assembly, the press, speech, 
and the right to petition.39  Throughout history, the government has 
implicated essential regulations concerning these protections.40  While 
states are not allowed to create laws banning protected rights and freedoms 
under the Constitution, they are provided reserved powers allowing them to 
“legislate and regulate to protect the health, safety, and morals of citizens” 
 
representation of sexual matters; and (c) is utterly without redeeming social [(literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific)] value”). 
35. PENAL CODE § 21.19. 
36. How a Bill Becomes a Law, TEX. HOUSE OF REPS., https://house.texas.gov/about-us/bill/ 
[https://perma.cc/NY86-N3BD] (explaining the process of how a bill becomes a state law in Texas). 
37. See Senate Committee on State Affairs (Part I), supra note 11; see also HB 2789, 86th Regular Session, 
supra note 11. 
38. David L. Hudson Jr., As-applied Challenges, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https:// 
www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/892/as-applied-challenges [https://perma.cc/K77E-3VZY] 
[hereinafter Hudson Jr., As-applied Challenges] (explaining when a governmental regulation is 
unconstitutional “on its face,” it means by “the very text of the policy”). 
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
40. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (holding certain “areas of speech 
can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content 
(obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the 
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their 
distinctively proscribable content”); see generally Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (holding the 
First Amendment does not protect libelous speech); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding 
states are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children). 
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unprotected under the Constitution.41  When utilizing their reserved 
powers, states have the power to regulate activity happening both in person 
and online, but these laws must not overly restrict one’s protected rights, or 
they will be found unconstitutional.42 
 A widely known regulation of the freedom of speech is the common ban 
of public nudity,43 or “public indecency,” which some states use as their 
standard for illegal nudity, generally referring to acts “involving nudity or 
sexual activity in view of the public, often with the intent to shock, offend, 
or arouse.”44  States and localities differ on what constitutes illegal public 
nudity, looking at what parts of the body must be exposed and whether the 
alleged nudist had a particular intent.45  The Supreme Court has clearly 
established its view on public nudity, calling it “the evil the State seeks to 
prevent, whether or not it is combined with expressive activity”46 and 
holding it is not free expression protected by the First Amendment.47  The 
Supreme Court has affirmed the right of individual states to define and 
outlaw public nudity, holding the states have a duty to “protect[] societal 
order and morality.”48  This authorization gives states leeway in enacting 
public indecency and nudity laws.   
For example, in California, in order to be convicted of indecent exposure, 
“the prosecution must prove an intent to sexually arouse, or sexually insult 
or offend someone.”49  Contrastingly, New York simply makes it a crime 
to not have clothes on one’s “private or intimate parts” in a public place.50  
In Texas: “A person commits an offense if the person knowingly engages in 
 
41. Federalism: A Division of Power, DALL. LEARNING CLOUD, https://dlc.dcccd.edu/txgov1-
2/federalism-a-division-of-power [https://perma.cc/JE6W-YUEX]. 
42. State Laws Held Unconstitutional, JUSTIA, https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/state-laws-
held-unconstitutional.html [https://perma.cc/5GQT-PX2D] (providing examples of state statutes 
found unconstitutional). 
43. Public Nudity Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/ 
public-nudity/ [https://perma.cc/9GQJ-NXR2] (defining public nudity as “the indecent exposure of 
nakedness in a public place”). 
44. Public Indecency, JUSTIA (Apr. 2018), https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/sex-
crimes/public-indecency/ [https://perma.cc/838H-3BN3]. 
45. Id. (describing the differences between public nudity, public indecency, illegal nudity, 
indecency exposure, and obscenity). 
46. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 568; see also Public Indecency, supra note 44. 
49. Indecent Exposure, FINDLAW, https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/indecent-
exposure.html [https://perma.cc/J76B-PSVL] (providing samples of states’ indecent exposure laws). 
50. Id. 
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any of the following acts in a public place or, if not in a public place, the 
person is reckless about whether another is present who will be offended or 
alarmed by the person’s act.”51  Texas’s indecent exposure law, which 
criminalizes exposing oneself to others in person, combined with a lack of 
comparative protection for those who are exposed to the same type of 
indecency online, is what prompted Bumble’s52 CEO, Whitney Wolfe, to 
advocate for H.B. 2789.53  H.B. 2789 was codified as Section 21.19 of the 
Texas Penal Code in 2019, becoming the first law criminalizing the 
transmission of visual material depicting a person’s exposed intimate 
parts.54   
Another widely known regulation of the freedom of speech is obscenity, 
which is also not protected by the First Amendment.55  The actual 
definition of obscenity varies from one community to another, and the 
Supreme Court established a three-part test for obscenity in Miller v. 
California.56  In determining whether works are obscene, the trier of fact 
must consider three guiding principles, including whether the works: 
(1) “taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, . . . [(2)] portray 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and . . . [(3)] do not have serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value [taken as a whole].”57  The Miller 
test for obscenity is carefully based on local community standards, as “[i]t is 
neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as 
requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of 
conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”58  Therefore, 
each state determines what is obscene by their definition of “sexual 
conduct.”59   
 
51. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08. 
52. What is Bumble?, BUMBLE, https://bumble.com/en/help/what-is—bumble [https:// 
perma.cc/KN9G-7YLN] (explaining Bumble is a dating app requiring women to make the first move). 
53. Pasarow, supra note 10 (“At Bumble, we believe that if it isn’t appropriate ‘IRL,’ it shouldn’t 
be tolerated on your devices.”). 
54.  PENAL CODE § 21.19. 
55. Public Indecency, supra note 44. 
56. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1973) (holding the First Amendment 
does not protect obscenity and creating a three-part test for obscenity). 
57. Id. at 24. 
58. Id. at 32. 
59. See PENAL CODE § 21.16 (“‘Sexual conduct’ means sexual contact, actual or simulated sexual 
intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, or sadomasochistic abuse.”); cf. 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.263 (West 2013) (“‘Sexual conduct’ means acts of masturbation, sexual 
penetration or physical contact with a person’s unclothed genitals or pubic area.”). 
10
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The Supreme Court has recognized “the States have a legitimate interest 
in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the 
mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the 
sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.”60  States, 
having this interest in protecting juveniles, have even gone so far as to 
prohibit the sale of nude magazines to minors—magazines likely not even 
considered obscene to adults.61  Ginsberg v. New York62 demonstrates 
government regulation can extend to settings where a person lacks the 
capacity to make a choice.63  This ultimately shows the flexibility of 
“obscenity,” allowing states to individually adjust the definition as applied 
to minors even when material may not be restricted to adults.  Thus, “the 
power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the 
scope of its authority over adults.”64  Although there is not an exhaustive 
and easily accessible list of what constitutes obscenity, in Miller v. California, 
the Court concluded no one would be subject to prosecution for the sale or 
exposure of materials unless they contained patently offensive “‘hard core’ 
sexual conduct” set out by the regulating state law.65  
It is important to distinguish obscene content from other potentially 
offensive expression—but which does not rise up to the level of 
obscenity—in order to properly analyze TPC Section 21.19.66  These non-
obscene expressions provide more to society than senseless gestures—they 
contain serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.67  Indecent 
content is an example.  Indecent content is differentiated from obscene 
 
60. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18–19 (footnote omitted). 
61. Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (“[T]he concept of obscenity or 
of unprotected matter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed 
or from whom it is quarantined . . . . [The State can bar] the distribution to children of books 
recognized to be suitable for adults.”). 
62. Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
63. Id. at 636; see also People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (1965) (Fuld, J., concurring) 
(“Parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and society’s transcendent interest in 
protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of material to them.”). 
64. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). 
65. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. 
66. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19.  
67. Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/ 
obscene-indecent-and-profane-broadcasts [https://perma. cc/B5H6-49U8] [hereinafter Obscene, 
Indecent and Profane Broadcasts] (defining indecent content as content “portray[ing] sexual or excretory 
organs or activities in a way that [is offensive but] does not meet the three-prong test for obscenity”). 
11
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content by “the absence of a prurient appeal,”68 portraying sexual or 
excretory organs or activities not meeting the three-prong test for 
obscenity.69  “Nudity alone does not render material obscene under Miller’s 
standards.”70  As previously mentioned, there is an understanding public 
nudity can be outlawed by individual states,71 but a nude photo in a medical 
textbook does not appeal to prurient interests in sex, portray sexual conduct 
in a patently offensive way, nor does it lack scientific value.   
It is essential to understand pictures, sculptures, or other forms of speech, 
including descriptive language,72 may be interpreted by some as obscene, 
but also contain artistic,73 literary,74 political, or scientific75 value and 
therefore be protected.  This third prong of the Miller test76 must be 
determined “solely on an objective basis as opposed to reference . . . to 
contemporary community standards.”77  The first two prongs of the test 
are subjective and must be analyzed individually—applying the relevant state 
 
68. First Amendment—Obscenity and Indecency, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 474, 480 (1978) 
(“The dissenters’ criticism of Pacifica demonstrates indecent speech is differentiated from obscene 
speech by the absence of a prurient appeal in the former and the presence of such an appeal in the 
latter.”); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 778 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted) (“[T]he Court today agrees, that ‘indecent’ is a broader concept than ‘obscene’ . . . because 
language can be ‘indecent’ although it . . . lacks prurient appeal.”). 
69. Ex Parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“Sexual expression 
which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment, . . . .”) (quoting Sable 
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). 
70. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974). 
71. Public Indecency, supra note 44. 
72. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121–22 (1973) (“As with pictures, films, paintings, 
drawings, and engravings, both oral utterance and the printed word have First Amendment protection 
until they collide with the long-settled position of this Court that obscenity is not protected by the 
Constitution.”). 
73. Michelangelo’s David, ACCADEMIA, http://www.accademia.org/explore-museum/artworks/ 
michelangelos-david/ [https://perma.cc/HCH8-S9WF] (describing the fourteen foot tall “marble 
statue depicting the Biblical hero David, represented as a standing male nude”—which some could 
initially perceive as obscene). 
74. The novel Ulysses contained a masturbation scene and a trial court banned the novel in the 
U.S.  However, the ruling was overturned twelve years later allowing U.S. publication in 1934.  See Tom 
Head, Top 10 “Obscene” Literary Classics, THOUGHTCO. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/ 
top-obscene-literary-classics-721234 [https://perma.cc/ZYA8-WUR9]. 
75. Rebecca Joines Schinsky, Six-Pack: Smart Books About the Science and Sociology of Sex, 
BOOKRIOT (Mar. 6, 2014), https://bookriot.com/2014/03/06/books-science-sociology-sex/ 
[https://perma.cc/S39F-KGDP] (listing books explaining sexual concepts, how American culture has 
defined sexual deviance and dysfunction, and containing research about the brain’s role in sex, love, 
and dating).  
76. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
77. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 499 (1987).  
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laws and “contemporary community standards”78—but the third prong is 
the only one analyzed on a national standard.  Obscenity must be construed 
on a case-by-case basis because two of the three prongs are subjective 
according to state and community standards.79  There have also been 
attempts to broaden the scope of the Miller test on a federal level.80  An 
example of this attempt was the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 
which made it a federal crime to use the Internet to communicate 
commercial material considered “harmful to minors.”81  COPA was 
ultimately held unconstitutional because it suppressed a wide range of 
speech adults have a right to communicate.82  Despite these challenges and 
attempts to broaden its scope, the Miller test still stands as the primary 
standard for obscenity.83   
2. The Growing Trend of Content-Based Regulations 
A content-based law or regulation “discriminates against speech based on 
the substance of what it communicates” and is presumed 
unconstitutional.84  This is different than a content-neutral law, which 
applies to expression without regard to its substance, generally regulating 
the time, place, and manner of speech.85  Content-based restrictions of 
speech are subject to strict scrutiny,86 the highest form of judicial review, 
and can only pass if the legislature “passed the law to further a ‘compelling 
governmental interest,’ and . . . narrowly tailored the law to achieve that 
 
78. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
79. Freedom of Expression, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/freedom-expression [https:// 
perma.cc/SK9P-VDBW] (“But the fact is, the obscenity exception to the First Amendment is highly 
subjective . . . .”) (emphasis removed). 
80. See generally Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 535 U.S. 564, 601 (2002) (holding Congress did not 
create an overbroad statute based on the use of “community standards” language in COPA alone; but 
remanding the case for future consideration of issues such as whether “the variation in community 
standards renders the Act substantially overbroad”). 
81. See id. at 569. 
82. Am. C.L. Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 207 (3d Cir. 2008). 
83. David L. Hudson Jr., Miller Test, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/ 
first-amendment/article/1585/miller-test [https://perma.cc/TCY3-TBHL] [hereinafter Hudson Jr., 
Miller Test]. 
84. David L. Hudson Jr., Content Based, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu. 
edu/first-amendment/article/935/content-based [https://perma.cc/Q7LB-TDU2] [hereinafter 
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interest.”87  This is regardless of the government’s “benign motive, content-
neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the 
regulated speech.”88  Although content-based restrictions are presumed 
unconstitutional,89 the Supreme Court has provided examples that have 
survived strict scrutiny and are constitutional.90  Some examples of 
constitutional content-based restrictions include: “[I]ncitement, obscenity, 
defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called ‘fighting words,’ 
child pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech presenting some grave 
and imminent threat the Government has the power to prevent.”91  These 
types of restrictions are not protected due to their harmful content and 
effects.92 
a. Protecting Minors 
The government has a strong “interest in protecting the physical and 
psychological well-being of children.”93  Osborne v. Ohio illustrates such an 
interest, wherein the Supreme Court upheld a state law prohibiting any 
person from possessing or viewing child pornography, even when privately 
in their own home.94  The Court recognized the law was in place to help 
destroy the “market for the exploitative use of children by penalizing those 
who possess and view the offending materials . . . which permanently record 
the victim’s abuse and thus may haunt him for years to come.”95  The 
government also has a strong interest against allowing minors to view 
 
87. Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny 
[https://perma.cc/X4FX-7DHM]. 
88. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015). 
89. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (listing several instances the 
Court has ruled against the First Amendment protection of free speech). 
90. See generally Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (“A long history, a substantial, 
consensus, and simple common sense show that some restricted zone around polling places is 
necessary to protect that fundamental right.”).  
91. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
92. Hudson Jr., Content Based, supra note 84. 
93. Government Restraining of Content of Expression, JUSTIA, https://law.justia.com/ 
constitution/us/amendment-01/16-government-restraint-of-content-of-expression.html [https:// 
perma.cc/MMM6-3M3D] [hereinafter Government Restraining of Content of Expression]  (providing in-
depth examples of government regulation of expression); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 
(1982) (creating greater leeway for states to regulate pornographic depictions of children). 
94. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 125 (1990). 
95. Id. at 103–04. 
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pornography.96  “One of the reasons given by legislators for passing statutes 
protecting children from viewing pornography is that adults use such 
material to lure children into engaging in sexual activity.”97  There is also a 
strong interest in protecting children from seeing and hearing not only 
obscene, but indecent material.98  This interest is apparent both in the way 
states prohibit public nudity or indecent exposure and in states’ authority to 
restrict the selling of obscene materials to minors.99  It is commonly known 
protecting minors from exposure to harmful visual material in the physical 
world is easier than doing so online.100  States have even gone so far as to 
regulate the availability of adult theaters that have no suggestive displays on 
the outside of the theater to only allow consenting adults to enter.101   
The Supreme Court has held “there are legitimate state interests at stake 
in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is 
feasible to enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to 
passersby.”102  The Supreme Court, as it held in FCC v. Pacifica,103 also 
allows regulation of radio broadcasting due to its “pervasive presence,”104 
ability to “extend into the privacy of the home[,]” and how impossible it is 
to “completely . . . avoid those [broadcasts] that are patently offensive.”105  
This ruling allows the FCC to regulate an indecent, but not obscene, radio 
broadcast, and the Court further explained it “never intended to place an 
 
96. Artemus Ward, Child Pornography, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu. 
edu/first-amendment/article/993/child-pornography [https://perma.cc/Y7BT-DVJ2] (providing 
background as to why Congress wants to restrict minors’ access to pornography). 
97. Id. 
98. Government Restraining of Content of Expression, supra note 93 (“[N]on-obscene but indecent 
language and nudity may be curtailed [in broadcasted speech], with the time of day and other 
circumstances determining the extent of curtailment.”). 
99. Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (citing People v. Kahan, 
206 N.E.2d 311, 334 (N.Y. 1965) (Fuld, J. concurring)) (“[P]arental control or guidance cannot always 
be provided and society’s transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable 
regulation of the sale of material to them.”). 
100. David L. Hudson Jr., Harmful to Minors Laws, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/966/harmful-to-minors-laws [https://perma.cc/J2 
VV-F2QF] [hereinafter Hudson Jr., Harmful to Minors Laws] (explaining what “‘harmful to minors’ laws” 
are—giving examples of both successful and non-successful ones). 
101. See generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (“We categorically 
disapprove the theory . . . obscene, pornographic films acquire constitutional immunity from state 
regulation simply because they are exhibited for consenting adults only.”). 
102. Id. 
103. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
104. Id. at 727. 
105. Id. at 727–28. 
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absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather 
sought to channel it to times of day when children most likely would not be 
exposed to it.”106  Although “broadcasting obscene content is prohibited 
by [federal] law at all times of the day[,] [i]ndecent and profane content are 
[only] prohibited on broadcast TV and radio between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m., 
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.”107  
The desire to protect minors has been prevalent throughout the rulings 
regulating obscene speech, as well as speech not rising to the level of 
obscenity.108  Although the U.S. has also successfully taken steps to protect 
minors from inadvertently accessing harmful material online,109 blanket 
efforts to prevent the online transmission of material harmful to minors 
have failed as they are often considered too broad110 and restrictive of 
adults’ rights to access content not necessarily considered obscene.111  The 
Supreme Court reasoned the government may shelter minors from 
potentially harmful speech, but a statute doing so “is unacceptable if less 
restrictive alternatives would be . . . effective in achieving the legitimate 
purpose” of the statute as the “burden on adult speech” would otherwise be 
too great.112 
States must tread lightly when passing laws to regulate content sharing 
and be fully aware of what they can and cannot restrict.  States must know 
in what capacity and circumstances they may restrict in order for the 
restriction to be constitutional.  
 
106. Id. at 733. 
107. Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, supra note 67. 
108. Government Restraining of Content of Expression, supra note 93 (providing examples of 
government regulation of expression citing to protecting minors). 
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2252B(a)–(b) (2006) (stating persons are subject to a fine, imprisonment, or 
both, who “knowingly uses a misleading domain name on the Internet with the intent to deceive a 
person into viewing material constituting obscenity . . . [or] knowingly uses a misleading domain name 
on the Internet with the intent to deceive a minor into viewing material that is harmful to minors on 
the Internet . . . .”). 
110. See Am. C.L. Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding a state statute 
“which criminalizes the dissemination by computer of material that is harmful to minors” violates the 
First Amendment); see also generally Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (“Notwithstanding 
the legitimacy and importance of the congressional goal of protecting children from harmful materials, 
we agree . . . the statute abridges ‘the freedom of speech’ protected by the First Amendment.”).  
111. Hudson Jr., Harmful to Minors Laws, supra note 100 (“Many [harmful-to-minors laws] limit 
distribution of sexually explicit material to minors.”). 
112. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874. 
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b. Banning Revenge Porn 
With the rise of the Internet and social media, revenge porn has become 
a new and damaging phenomenon.  Revenge porn has been defined as 
“sexually explicit images of a person posted online without that person’s 
consent[,] especially as a form of revenge or harassment.”113  These explicit 
photos are generally disseminated in “retaliation for a romantic rebuff.”114  
They are often “accompanied by the victim’s name, address, phone number, 
Facebook page, and other personal information. . . . They are seen on the 
Internet by prospective employers and customers.  Victims have been 
subjected to harassment, stalking, and threats of sexual assault.”115  State 
laws prohibiting the distribution of revenge porn restrict speech on the basis 
of its content.116  Not only are the laws considered content-based 
restrictions, but they have also been interpreted as being viewpoint-
discriminatory,117 which is defined as “singling out a particular opinion or 
perspective on that subject matter for treatment unlike that given to other 
viewpoints.”118   
Revenge porn laws can be interpreted as being viewpoint-discriminatory 
because non-child pornography is legal to view, watch, and distribute (to 
adults),119 but the government wants to limit this when someone sends out 
these explicit images and videos with an ill-intent.  The content itself is not 
illegal—if the person depicted in the video(s) and image(s) is of age—but 
the government wants to make its distribution illegal if it harbors ill-intent, 
which in turn singles out a particular perspective regarding the subject 
matter.  Viewpoint discrimination is often implicated through governmental 
discretion.120  This type of discrimination is presumed unconstitutional.121  
 
113. Revenge Porn, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rev 
enge%20porn [https://perma.cc/UBX7-BQXB] 
114. John A. Humbach, The Constitution and Revenge Porn, 35 PACE L. REV. 215, 215 (2014). 
115. Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661, 
661 (2016). 
116. Id. at 662. 
117. Id. 
118. Kevin Francis O’Neill, Viewpoint Discrimination, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1028/viewpoint-discrimination [https://perma.cc/ 
SSW8-799C]. 
119. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.24. 
120. O’Neill, supra note 118. 
121. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“In the 
realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another.  
Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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Nevertheless, in the U.S., forty-seven states and one territory have 
implemented revenge porn laws.122  The various states’ revenge porn laws 
are diverse in their punishments, ranging from misdemeanor to felony 
convictions.123  Although revenge porn has not been recognized as an 
exception to the ban on content-based restrictions,124 some states have 
written their laws in a manner narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
interest, surviving strict scrutiny and thus rendering them constitutional.125  
In 2018, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld its state’s revenge porn law 
against a First Amendment challenge by comparing the “state’s interest in 
preventing the unauthorized disclosure of intimate images with the state’s 
interest in other forms of content-based restrictions on speech, such as 
restrictions on the disclosure of medical information or social security 
numbers.”126   
Other states have tailored their laws to meet this requirement after being 
previously found to be overbroad and unconstitutional.127  For example, in 
2014, Texas passed its own revenge porn law, prohibiting anyone from 
“distributing images or video showing ‘a person’s intimate parts exposed’ or 
engaging in sexual contact without the person’s knowledge or consent”128 
when the material was “[(1)] obtained by the person or created under 
circumstances in which the depicted person had a reasonable expectation 
that the visual material would remain private; [(2)] the disclosure . . . causes 
harm to the depicted person; and . . . [(3)] reveals the identity of the depicted 
 
122. 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/E2KR-3UWW]. 
123. Michelle Mark, et al., Here’s a Map Showing Which US States Have Passed Laws Against Revenge 
Porn—and Those Where It’s Still Legal, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.bus 
inessinsider.com/map-states-where-revenge-porn-banned-2019-10 [https://perma.cc/J4B7-9EM2] 
(providing a map of the United States displaying which states have revenge porn laws and what 
punishments accompany their respective violations). 
124. Koppelman, supra note 115, at 662. 
125. Nicole McLemore, “Revenge Porn” Law Survives Constitutional Challenge in Vermont, CYBER 
C.R. INITIATIVE (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-law-survives-
constitutional-challenge-vermont/ [https://perma.cc/766D-P656]. 
126. Id. 
127. Stephen Young, Texas Fixes Its Revenge Porn Law, DALL. OBSERVER (May 20, 2019, 
6:56 AM) https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/texas-passes-revenge-porn-fix-11668838 [https:// 
perma.cc/DM46-6RZ7] (discussing the issue with holding third parties liable in the first Texas revenge 
porn law, stating: “To break the new law as outlined in the bill, . . . the person posting the videos or 
photos online would have to be intentionally harming the person depicted in the photos”). 
128. Id. 
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person in any manner.”129  This law initially made third parties liable for 
the “distribution of covered content even if the defendant had no 
knowledge of the circumstances under which the image was taken or the 
privacy expectations of the person depicted.”130  The law was struck down 
as overbroad131 and was subsequently amended by adding an “intent to 
harm a person” provision to make sure third parties were not negatively 
impacted.132  Overall, states seem to be successful in passing revenge porn 
laws by narrowly tailoring them to serve a compelling interest. 
3. Where This Leaves Us 
a. Gaps in Texas Law—the Need to Fill a Void in Online Sexual 
Advances  
The Internet is a relatively new and revolutionary phenomenon that has 
allowed people to communicate easier than ever before—almost 
instantaneously.  Following this new technology, new laws must be 
implemented to protect people from an array of wrongdoing.  Many of these 
laws punishing online offenders mimic existing laws protecting those in the 
“real world,” or provide unity by punishing acts done in person and online 
indiscriminately.133  In Texas, there are harassment, revenge porn, 
cyberbullying, and other laws in place to combat online crimes.  None of 
these laws are as strict, per se, as TPC Section 21.19, which makes it a 
crime—even on the first occasion—to knowingly transmit visual material 
depicting a person’s exposed intimate parts if the receiving individual did 
not expressly consent to or request the media.134  The Texas harassment 
 
129. Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Law Prohibiting ‘Revenge Porn’ Violates First Amendment, Says Texas 
Appeals Court, REASON (Apr. 23, 2018, 2:20 PM), https://reason.com/2018/04/23/texas-revenge-
porn/ [https://perma.cc/RH3U-5AN2]. 
130. Thomas Claburn, Revenge Pornography Ban Tramples Free Speech, Law Tossed Out—Where Else 
but Texas!, REGISTER (Apr. 24, 2018, 12:41 AM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/04/24/ 
texas_first_amendment_revenge_x_rated/ [https://perma.cc/CH24-54C4]. 
131. Ex parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *8 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 16, 
2018, pet. granted) (showing defendant indicted under Texas’s first revenge porn law in 2017 had the 
charge dropped by the Twelfth Court of Appeals, as the law was ruled an “invalid content-based 
restriction and overbroad in the sense that it violates rights of too many third parties by restricting 
more speech than the Constitution permits”). 
132. Young, supra note 127. 
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2019) (“A person who willfully, maliciously, and 
repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking, a 
misdemeanor of the first degree . . . .”). 
134. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19. 
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law is somewhat similar, punishing someone who intends to harass, annoy, 
alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another by initiating “communication 
and in the course of the communication makes a comment, request, 
suggestion, or proposal that is obscene.”135   
It seems both laws share, in part, the same legislative intent—to protect 
those who did not consent to receiving inappropriate materials—but each 
has different intent requirements.136  Texas Penal Code Section 21.19 also 
seems to be written with the intent to protect those who wish to avoid this 
type of material in a purely social or dating atmosphere.  Contrastingly, the 
harassment law is broader, as the criminalizing of intentionally transmitting 
obscene material is only one part of the law.137  Texas Penal Code 
Section 21.19 takes a narrower approach, clarifying what is prohibited,138 
and becoming Texas’s only law solely focused on preventing online sexual 
advances.  This type of law is essential in a society where it is so easy to 
commit indecent exposure online—anonymously, even.139  Texas Penal 
Code Section 21.19 serves as a necessary deterrent to those who feel entitled 
to expose themselves through electronic means without being asked.  An 
effective law will hopefully reduce these incidences in the long run. 
III.    TEXAS PENAL CODE SECTION 21.19 WILL BE DECLARED 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
A. Texas Penal Code Section 21.19 Is Facially Unconstitutional 
The government has more flexibility and control regulating in-person 
indecency and nudity—or when it is transmitted by broadcasting—because 
minors can be easily subjected to it.140  There are also federal laws 
protecting children from harmful or obscene material on the Internet, which 
 
135. Id. § 42.07(a)(1). 
136. Compare id. § 21.19 (requiring the offender “knowingly” send inappropriate materials), with 
id. § 42.07(a)(1) (requiring the offender send inappropriate materials with “intent to harass, annoy, 
alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another”). 
137. Id. § 42.07(a). 
138. Id. § 21.19(b)(1). 
139. Mikey Campbell, Sending Unsolicited Nudes via AirDrop Might Soon Be Illegal in NYC,  
APPLEINSIDER (Nov. 30, 2018, 10:00 PM), https://appleinsider.com/articles/18/12/01/sending-
unsolicited-nudes-via-airdrop-might-soon-be-illegal-in-nyc [https://perma.cc/M4M8-87N3] (noting 
AirDrop presents a preview of the image on the receiver’s screen before they choose to accept or 
decline it, and users can send files anonymously). 
140. Public Indecency, supra note 44. 
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are not analogous to the protections adults have.141  What is harmful to 
minors is not always the same as what is harmful to adults.  Even though 
harmful-to-minors laws may be more restricting, they typically survive 
constitutional challenge.142  For a state’s speech regulation to pass judicial 
muster, it must survive strict scrutiny.143  TPC Section 21.19’s language 
criminalizing those who send visual materials of a “person’s intimate parts 
exposed” is subject to strict scrutiny because the material is protected free 
speech.144  This language alone makes TPC Section 21.19 facially 
unconstitutional because it is overbroad—deterring both constitutionally 
protected speech and unconstitutional speech.145  The protected speech in 
this case would be a “person’s intimate parts exposed,” such as genitalia, the 
female nipple, or buttocks.  Obscenity, however, would be 
unconstitutional—and therefore unprotected—speech TPC Section 21.19 
is trying to deter.146 
1. Introduce the Language  
H.B. 2789 (Texas Penal Code Section 21.19) “relat[es] to the creation of 
the criminal offense of unlawful electronic transmission of sexually explicit 
visual material.”147  H.B. 2789 explains “intimate parts,” “sexual conduct,” 
and “visual material” have meanings assigned by Section 21.16 of the Texas 
 
141. See Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on Obscenity, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-obscenity [https://perma.cc/ 
A22D-MCX7] (“It is illegal for an individual to knowingly use interactive computer services to display 
obscenity in a manner that makes it available to a minor less than 18 years of age.  It is also illegal to 
knowingly make a commercial communication via the Internet that includes obscenity and is available 
to any minor less than 17 years of age.”) (citations omitted). 
142. See Hudson Jr., Harmful to Minors Laws, supra note 100 (“Nearly every state has some form 
of harmful-to-minors law.  Many of these laws limit distribution of sexually explicit material to 
minors.”). 
143. See Strict Scrutiny, supra note 87 (providing an overview of strict scrutiny). 
144. See Victoria L. Killion, First Amendment: Categories of Speech, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 1–2 
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11072/3 [https://perma.cc/GY
T9-Q7CG] (listing examples of unprotected speech, none of which include “nudity” or “intimate parts 
exposed”). 
145. David L. Hudson Jr., Facial Challenges, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/954/facial-challenges [https://perma.cc/WTR3-
TC22] (providing an overview of facial unconstitutionality). 
146. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (holding obscenity is not protected by the 
First Amendment). 
147. Act of Apr. 25, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 848, § 1, sec. 21.19, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 848 
(codified at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19). 
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Penal Code.148  H.B. 2789 starts by criminalizing “any person engaging in 
sexual conduct or with the person’s intimate parts exposed.”149  H.B. 2789 
allows for prosecution of people who knowingly, electronically transmit 
visual material of “covered genitals of a male person that are in a discernibly 
turgid state”150—without the “request of or with the express consent of the 
recipient.”151  “Person” is not explicitly defined within H.B. 2789, but is 
defined within Chapter 1, Section 1.07 of the Texas Penal Code, entitled: 
“General Provisions.”152  However, the key phrase “express consent” is not 
defined within H.B. 2789, nor is it defined within the Texas Penal Code.  
Since “express consent” lacks statutory definition, the courts should read 
this phrase “in context and construed according to . . . common usage”153 
and construe the phrase accordingly if it has “acquired a technical or 
particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise.”154 
2. Definition of “Person” 
Although the meaning of the word “person” and how it is used within 
H.B. 2789 does not contribute to it being unconstitutional, it is necessary to 
know the definition and understand how it affects bill interpretation.  Texas 
Penal Code Section 1.07 defines “person” as “an individual or a corporation, 
association, limited liability company, or other entity or organization 
governed by the Business Organizations Code.”155  Within the same 
section, “individual” is defined as a “human being who is alive, including an 
unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.”156  
This definition completely rules out the criminalization of sending pictures 
of drawings or other art pieces such as Michelangelo’s David, which may 
show exposed intimate parts.157  On the other hand, this definition allows 
prosecution of those who send photos or videos of any live human’s or 
 
148. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19. 
149. Id. § 21.19(b)(1)(A). 
150. Id. § 21.19(b)(1)(B). 
151. Id. § 21.19(b)(2). 
152. Id. § 1.07(a)(38). 
153. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a). 
154. Id. § 311.011(b). 
155. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(38). 
156. Id. § 1.07(a)(26). 
157. Howard Halle, The Top Famous Sculptures of All Time, TIMEOUT (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.timeout.com/newyork/art/top-famous-sculptures-of-all-time [https://perma.cc/Y7 
LR-DHAN] (showing a photo of Michelangelo’s sculpture, “David”). 
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unborn child’s intimate parts without express consent of the recipient.158  
This prohibition would technically prohibit sending a photo of a person’s 
nude newborn child to a person—even a family member of the newborn—
without their consent, which is a fairly common practice. 
3. Any Person Engaging in Sexual Conduct 
Someone is criminalized under TPC Section 21.19 if—without express 
consent—they send visual materials of any person engaging in sexual 
conduct.159  “Sexual conduct” is defined as “sexual contact, actual or 
simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, 
masturbation, or sadomasochistic abuse” within Texas Penal Code 
Section 21.16.160  Obscenity is not protected speech under the First 
Amendment.161  Although neither Section 21.19 nor Section 21.16 of the 
Texas Penal Code define “sexual conduct” as obscenity, obscene 
transmissions of sexual conduct are unprotected and can be criminalized 
under TPC Section 21.19.162  All fifty states have laws regulating and 
controlling obscene material.163  Legal obscenity varies from state to state 
and depends on states’ standards of “whether the work depicts or describes, 
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct.”164  What is patently offensive 
is determined by the trier of fact and depends on the community standards 
in each state.165  “Materials that are declared legally obscene are not 
protected; they may be censored, and [the] creators and distributors may be 
punished, sometimes with jail sentences” depending on the state law.166  
Ultimately, if the sexual conduct transmitted is considered obscene it can be 
criminalized under TPC Section 21.19.   
 
158.  PENAL CODE § 21.19. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. § 21.16 (defining terms set out in TPC Section 21.19). 
161. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding obscenity is not protected by 
the First Amendment). 
162. Hudson Jr., Miller Test, supra note 83. 
163. Obscenity, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/obscenity [https:// 
perma.cc/A6HT-LA96]. 
164. Hudson Jr., Miller Test, supra note 83. 
165. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (explaining what appeals to the “prurient interest” and what is 
“patently offensive” are questions of fact—it is unreasonable for all states to uniformly have the same 
standards). 
166. Obscenity, COMM. L. & ETHICS, https://revolutionsincommunication.com/law/?page_ 
id=45 [https://perma.cc/ZG2H-GP7Y]. 
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4. Person’s Intimate Parts Exposed 
Sending visual material depicting a person’s exposed intimate parts 
without the recipient’s request or express consent is considered unlawful 
under TPC Section 21.19.167  Texas Penal Code Section 21.19 instructs 
“intimate parts” should be defined using the definition in Section 21.16.168  
“Intimate parts” is thus defined as “the naked genitals, pubic area, anus, 
buttocks, or female nipple of a person.”169  As previously explained, 
obscenity is not protected speech under the First Amendment; therefore, it 
may be regulated and even banned from being sold or transmitted at the 
discretion of each state.170  The second prong of the Miller test for obscenity 
requires the speech to depict or describe, “in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law.”171  In Texas, 
“sexual conduct” is defined as “sexual contact, actual or simulated sexual 
intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, or 
sadomasochistic abuse.”172  “Sexual contact” is defined as “any touching of 
the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to 
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.”173  Sending material 
which has only intimate parts exposed does not fall under the scope of 
“sexual conduct.”174  Therefore, because simply exposed intimate parts 
does not meet the second prong of the Miller test, it cannot be categorized 
as obscenity.175   
Texas Penal Code Section 21.19, in this case, is trying to place a restriction 
on content-based speech.176  This type of speech is protected under the 
First Amendment, and if this protected content-based speech is restricted, 
the restriction must be subjected to strict scrutiny.177  There are three levels 
 
167. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. § 21.16. 
170. Obscenity, supra note 163.  
171. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
172. PENAL CODE § 21.16. 
173. Id. § 21.01. 
174. Id. § 21.16. 
175. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (listing the second prong of the Miller test).  But see PENAL CODE 
§ 21.19(b)(1)(A) (including sexual misconduct or the exposure of intimate parts in the definition). 
176. David L. Hudson Jr., Content Neutral, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://mtsu.edu/ 
first-amendment/article/937/content-neutral [https://perma.cc/87EP-NL5P] (“Content neutral 
refers to laws that apply to all expression without regard to the substance or message of the 
expression . . . in contrast to content-based laws.”). 
177. Strict Scrutiny, supra note 87. 
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of scrutiny determining “how courts prioritize competing interests of 
individual and governmental claimants.”178  “Strict scrutiny is the most 
demanding form of judicial review.”179  The Supreme Court has ruled strict 
scrutiny applies to “governmental classifications that are constitutionally 
‘suspect,’ or that interfere with fundamental rights.”180  The Constitution 
identifies fundamental rights, including the First Amendment right to free 
speech.181  In order to prohibit this type of protected speech, the law must 
have been passed to further a compelling governmental interest and have 
been narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.182  Although “compelling” 
has not been explicitly defined, it has been intended to be a higher interest 
than simply being “important” or “legitimate.”183 
Examples of visual materials that would be criminalized under TPC 
Section 21.19, if not sent with express consent, include: pictures of 
newborn’s buttocks, a sonogram depicting the intimate parts of an unborn 
child,184 a picture of a woman breastfeeding displaying a female nipple,185 
a photo of an intimate part sent to an online doctor,186 and much more.  
Not only do these examples represent non-obscene visual material,187 but 
TPC Section 21.19 does not contain the “intent” element Texas’s indecent 
exposure law contains.188  It also does not include the “intentionally” or 
“knowingly” elements like Texas’s disorderly conduct law.189  Lack of an 
 
178. Steiner, supra note 3 (explaining the different levels of governmental scrutiny). 
179. Rodney M. Perry, Obergefell v. Hodges: Same-Sex Marriage Legalized, FED’N AM. 
SCIENTIST 1 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44143.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JZZ-GL2Z]. 
180. Id. at 1.  
181. Fundamental Right, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/funda 
mental_right [https://perma.cc/7CG8-8LJL]. 
182. Strict Scrutiny, supra note 87 (providing an overview of strict scrutiny). 
183. Perry, supra note 179 at 2.  
184. Ultrasound: Pelvic, Pregnancy, and Abdominal, UPMC, https://www.upmc.com/patients-
visitors/education/pregnancy/ultrasound-pelvic-pregnancy-and-abdominal [https://perma.cc/QD 
8L-ZE4T] (explaining a baby’s genitals may be visible during an ultrasound). 
185. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.002 (“A mother is entitled to breast-feed her 
baby or express breast milk in any location in which the mother’s presence is otherwise authorized.”). 
186. In-Person Consult No Longer Necessary For Online Doctor “Visit”, CBS DFW (June 1, 2017), 
https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2017/06/01/in-person-consult-no-longer-necessary-for-online-doctor-vis 
it/ [https://perma.cc/RM7H-2Q5D] (explaining Texas allows consultation with a doctor via an app 
or without seeing a doctor in person first). 
187. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 24 (1973) (stating, to be obscene, the speech must depict 
or describe “in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law”); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16 (indicating intimate parts exposed does not rise to the 
level of being labeled “sexual conduct”). 
188. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08. 
189. Id. § 42.01(a)(10). 
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intent element, combined with the fact some images or videos may be 
criminalized which would not normally be seen as indecent or offensive, 
makes TPC Section 21.19 problematic.   
Due to the fact TPC Section 21.19 restricts protected content-based 
speech, the government must prove the law was passed to further a 
“compelling governmental interest” and must have been narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest.190  The intent of this bill is to prevent unwanted 
sexually explicit pictures from being sent to unwilling recipients, and it is 
clear that this bill is not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, as it 
criminalizes visual material which may not be obscene or unwanted.  This 
categorizes the bill as being too broad to conform to this requirement, 
subsequently regulating protected speech.  The legislative intent of 
H.B. 2789 (TPC Section 21.19) is to essentially make indecent exposure 
over the Internet or via electronic means illegal.191  In order to pass a bill 
to regulate this speech, there cannot be any less discriminatory means 
available in order to achieve the governmental goal.192  Texas Penal Code 
Section 21.19 does not use the least restrictive means to achieve its goal, and 
“if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser 
burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the 
way of greater interference.”193   
Although wanting to create protection for those online who are victims 
of indecent exposure and creating a deterrent for future potential violators 
can both be used by the State to argue a compelling government interest, 
the final draft of TPC Section 21.19 was not written narrowly enough to be 
constitutional.  Lawmakers did not take the proper steps to ensure this bill 
would not criminalize parties exercising their protected First Amendment 
rights. 
5. Defining “Request” and “Express Consent” 
Texas Penal Code Section 21.19 makes it a crime to knowingly send visual 
material depicting: “(A) any person engaging in sexual conduct or with the 
person’s intimate parts exposed; or (B) covered genitals of a male person 
that are in a discernibly turgid state” without being requested or without the 
 
190. Strict Scrutiny, supra note 87. 
191. HB 2789, 86th Regular Session, supra note 11 (“Online recordings of House hearings for the 
86th Regular Session,” “Video/Audio,” “86th Session (2019-2020)” under “Committees,” “Criminal 
Jurisprudence” link on “3/25/19” starting at 3:30). 
192. Strict Scrutiny, supra note 87 (providing an overview of strict scrutiny). 
193. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). 
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express consent of the recipient.194  “Request” and “express consent” are 
not defined within TPC Section 21.19, nor are they defined within 
Section 1.07195 or in Section 21.16,196 which define some of the terms set 
out in TPC Section 21.19.  TPC Section 1.07 does define “consent” as 
meaning “assent in fact, whether express or apparent” but does not give 
direction as to how one would define “express consent.”197   
When words or phrases are not explicitly defined within the statute and 
legislative intent cannot be determined, the courts should then read the 
words “in context and construed according to . . . common usage”198 and 
construe them accordingly if they have “acquired a technical or particular 
meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise.”199  What 
constitutes a crime under TPC Section 21.19 is very different from other 
Texas laws which include the word “consent.”200  In TPC Section 22.011, 
the law for sexual assault, there are not definitions provided for the words 
“consent” or “express consent,” but rather provides certain definitions of 
“without consent” and how it applies to in-person sexual assault cases.201  
This does not allow an individual to apply the same meaning given to 
“consent” in TPC Section 21.19 because 21.19 only deals with electronic 
visual material.202  These sections address different circumstances and 
therefore the definition of “without consent” from Section 22.011 cannot 
appropriately apply to TPC Section 21.19.   
Texas, by implementing TPC Section 21.19, became the first state to 
“directly combat unsolicited sexually explicit photos.”203  States without 
laws addressing revenge porn or other types of stalking or harassment 
usually require an intent element.204  This typically fails to provide the 
recipient protection from receiving unwanted visual material the very first 
 
194.  PENAL CODE § 21.19 (codifying H.B. 2789). 
195. Id. § 1.07. 
196. Id. § 21.16. 
197. Id. § 1.07(a)(11). 
198. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a). 
199. Id. § 311.011(b). 
200. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01. 
201. Id. § 22.011. 
202. Id. § 21.19(b). 
203. R.J. Johnson, New Law in Texas Makes it a Crime to Send Unsolicited Nude Photos, 
IHEARTRADIO (Sep. 1, 2019), https://www.iheart.com/content/2019-09-01-new-law-in-texas-
makes-it-a-crime-to-send-unsolicited-nude-photos/ [https://perma.cc/GR58-LCRD]. 
204. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4.1 (West 2014) (including “intent to harass” in the definition 
of Cyberstalking law); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2 (West 2019) (“A person who, with intent 
to harass . . . .”). 
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time it is sent, unless it can be proven the perpetrator intended to harass, 
annoy, et cetera.  Therefore, Texas cannot rely on other state laws to assist 
in defining “express consent.”  Because “express consent” is not explicitly 
defined within the statute and legislative intent cannot be determined, it 
should be read according to common usage.205   
Although “express consent” is not defined in the Texas Penal Code, 
“consent” is defined as “assent in fact, whether express or apparent.”206  
“Assent” can then be defined as an “[a]greement, approval, or permission; 
esp[ecially], verbal or nonverbal conduct reasonably interpreted as 
willingness.”207  “Express assent” is then defined as “[a]ssent clearly and 
unmistakably communicated.”208  When an element is “in fact,” it is an 
issue of fact to be “resolved by a trier of fact, i.e., a jury or, at a bench trial, 
a judge, weighing the strength of evidence and credibility of witnesses.”209  
When applied to TPC Section 21.19, the jury, or if a bench trial, the judge, 
uses the evidence to decide whether the recipient of the material requested 
or expressly consented to receiving it.210   
The context, if any, of the conversation between the recipient and the 
sender will most likely determine whether the sender broke the law under 
TPC Section 21.19.  Context may be lacking if the visual image was sent 
without any previous messaging back and forth between the sender and the 
recipient.  If the recipient met the sender at a bar or on a dating site and 
exchanged numbers, one could argue this interaction alone is not express 
assent to receive a sexually explicit photo.  But what if the two are messaging 
back and forth and the conversation turns into one more flirtatious, erotic, 
or sexual nature?  A conversation of this nature, depending on the facts and 
wording of the conversation, may constitute express assent.211  The 
definition of “assent” can then be subjective,212 as the permission or 
approval is supposed to be reasonably determined as willingness.   
To some, a flirtatious and seemingly sexual conversation, despite the 
recipient not literally and explicitly approving of receiving a sexually explicit 
 
205. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a). 
206. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(11). 
207. Assent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
208. Express Assent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
209. Question of Fact, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/question_of_fact 
[https://perma.cc/A7SC-XGQC]. 
210.  PENAL CODE § 21.19(b)(2). 
211. See Express Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[a]ssent clearly and 
unmistakably communicated.”). 
212. Assent, supra note 207. 
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photo, may be determined as willingness to receive such a kind of visual 
material.  Others might argue it is not considered willingness, especially not 
by clear and unmistakably communicated assent.  The subjective aspect of 
TPC Section 21.19 might make it difficult for prosecutors and juries to 
established and decide whether the recipient “expressly consented” to 
receiving of visual material.  This may also be complicated by a generational 
disconnect, due to a major shift in dating culture, for determining what 
constitutes assent when it comes to dating and online conversations.   
The term “request” on the other hand, is not as complicated to interpret 
as “express consent” within the context of TPC Section 21.19.  TPC 
Section 21.19 criminalizes those who send sexual visual materials if it is not 
sent at the “request of or with the express consent of the recipient.”213  
Request can be defined as “the act of an instance of asking for 
something.”214  This is more direct and less ambiguous than “express 
consent” because the legislative intent of the bill was to prevent unsolicited 
sexually explicit visual material from reaching unwilling participants,215 and 
“request” makes it necessary for the recipient to be more proactive in asking 
for the pictures than merely exhibiting conduct that that can be interpreted 
as willingness.  Although there cannot be a definitive phrase or exact 
wording to define “request” in this scenario, it can be inferred the person 
requesting would in some way need to ask the sender to send this specific 
visual material.  Overall, these terms may make it more difficult for 
prosecutors to determine whether the law has been broken under TPC 
Section 21.19 given the current dating culture. 
IV.    UNDERLYING ISSUES  
A. Enforceability of Texas Penal Code Section 21.19 
There are many things to consider when trying to enforce a law such as 
TPC Section 21.19.  There are multiple necessary steps, including: (1) the 
recipient properly preserving the visual material and proving the person who 
owned the phone actually sent the illegal material; (2) the recipient did not 
 
213. PENAL CODE § 21.19(b)(2). 
214. Request, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/request 
[https://perma.cc/X7UC-BU8B] (defining “request”). 
215. Senate Committee on State Affairs (Part I), supra note 11 (showing a recording with witness 
testimony from Senator Joan Huffman among others—the relevant portion starts at the ten-minute 
mark and discusses the intent of H.B. 2789). 
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request or expressly consent to receive the material; and (3) making sure the 
district attorney’s office has the resources to try the case—assuming it 
exercised its discretion and decided to move forward with prosecution.  Two 
main issues with the overall process of prosecuting under TPC 
Section 21.19 are the possibility of claims of mistake and breaking past the 
stigma of receiving and reporting unsolicited sexually explicit photos. 
1. Potential Claims of Mistake 
During trial, when a piece of evidence is introduced, the proponent 
usually has to authenticate or properly identify it.216  This is normally done 
by producing “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what 
the proponent claims it is.”217  Some examples of evidence that satisfies 
that requirement include: testimony of a witness with knowledge,218 
distinctive characteristics,219 and opinion about a voice.220   
With TPC Section 21.19, the crime committed is the sending of 
unsolicited material through electronic means.221  Therefore, the evidence 
needed to prosecute is the photo or video on the recipient’s phone.  In 
addition to proving the accuracy of the duplicated photo(s) or video(s), the 
proponent must also show the “persons to whom they seek to ascribe the 
messages actually wrote them.”222  This is crucial to prove because if the 
evidence is not authenticated, it is not relevant and ultimately is 
inadmissible.223  Although accomplishing this seems straightforward in the 
sense that one would assume if a picture came from a certain phone number, 
the owner of that phone number was the person who sent it—this is not 
always the case.  Something sent from one’s phone could have been sent by 
someone with access to the phone, or even a hacker.   
It has been noted “electronic evidence, including cell phone text 
messages, is most often authenticated through witness testimony and 
circumstantial evidence.”224  For example, if the photo is sent out of the 
blue, without previous conversation or if the owner of the phone denies 
 
216. See TEX. R. EVID. 901(a) (providing the necessary steps for authenticating or identifying 
evidence). 
217. Id. 
218. Id. R. 901(b)(1). 
219. Id. R. 901(b)(4). 
220. Id. R. 901(b)(5). 
221. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19. 
222. Grosdidier, supra note 24.  
223. See id. (“Evidence that cannot be authenticated is not relevant and is inadmissible.”). 
224. Id. at 9. 
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sending it, it can be more difficult to prove they were the sender than with 
this identifying information.  The possible sender, who could be the owner 
of the phone, may prompt possible defenses by saying someone took the 
phone and sent the photo without the sender’s consent, or even that a 
hacker sent the photo.  In August 2018, State Senator Charles Schwertner 
was accused of sending sexually explicit messages to a student at the 
University of Texas.225  The Senator denied the accusations, and although 
the offensive messages came from his Hushed account—a privacy app 
allowing users to use a separate phone number—and his LinkedIn account, 
a forensic investigation found the messages did not come from his personal 
phone.226   
During the investigation, an attorney representing an unknown third 
party claimed his client was the sender.  Schwertner corroborated this 
person’s story, stating he knew this person and had shared his user name 
and passwords with them, so it was possible they sent them without 
Schwertner’s permission.227  Despite Schwertner receiving the student’s 
number through LinkedIn and sending her a follow-up LinkedIn message 
directing her to the text messages he had sent her, even referring to the 
LinkedIn message in the following text messages, the University of Texas 
could not prove Schwertner sent the messages himself.228  The University 
even released an image of “Schwertner’s legislative business card, where the 
[alternate] phone number used for the texts is written in by hand.”229  
Although the University acknowledged the unnamed person might not exist, 
they reported the evidence provided was not enough to prove Schwertner 
was the one who sent the messages.  The investigation was completed 
without assigning blame to a party.230  This example shows just how 
difficult it can be to prove a certain individual sent a specific image or 
message.   
Although there are multiple avenues a recipient or law enforcement 
agency may use, such as an in-depth investigation like Schwertner’s, there 
may not be available time or the necessary resources to do so within some 
jurisdictions.  Overcoming potential claims of mistake may be an extremely 
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difficult obstacle for those without resources, and circumstantial or direct 
evidence, needed to convict or indict a particular person. 
2. Stigma Surrounding Receiving and Reporting Unsolicited Pictures 
In this new digital age, sharing photos, ideas, and so much more online is 
viewed as a regular part of daily life, given the accessibility of the Internet 
and smartphones.  In addition to the advantages of communicating online 
with others, issues arise, including online harassment and abuse.231  
Although men are typically more likely to experience any form of harassing 
behavior online, women encounter sexualized forms of abuse at much 
higher rates than men.232  A U.S. survey found women, especially young 
women, “encounter sexualized forms of abuse at much higher rates than 
men.  Some 21% of women ages 18 to 29 report being sexually harassed 
online, a figure that is more than double the share among men in the same 
age group (9%).”233  There are multiple theories as to why some men send 
unsolicited photos of their genitals, including: (1) men often misperceive a 
woman’s interest; (2) they find it thrilling; (3) it may be borne of hostility; 
(4) it may be about dominance; and (5) there may be an evolutionary 
basis.234  No matter the reason for sending these unsolicited images, 
receiving them has become a normalized part of some women’s lives.235  
Because it is a common, talked-about, and sometimes brushed-off 
occurrence, the criminalizing of these acts may not be taken seriously.  
Women are almost expected to either ignore these sexual advances or not 
take them seriously.   
 
231. See Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment 2017, PEW RES. CTR: INTERNET & TECH. (July 11, 
2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/ [https:// 
perma.cc/6YRT-ZW4N] (“Men and women experience and respond to online harassment in different 
ways.”). 
232. See id. (“[W]omen are about twice as likely as men to say they have been targeted as a result 
of their gender . . . . [Men] are around twice as likely as women to say they have experience harassment 
online as a result of their political views . . . .”). 
233. Id. 
234. See Doug Criss, Wonder Why Men Send Photos of Their Genitals?  Here Are Some Theories, CNN: 
HEALTH. (Feb. 10, 2019, 5:44 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/09/health/reasons-why-men-
send-explicit-photos-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/4QLW-96BW] (providing different theories 
by multiple people, including a sex therapist and psychotherapist as to why men send photos of their 
genitals). 
235. Jennifer Swann, 19 Women on What It’s Like to Receive Dick Pics, MEL, 
https://melmagazine.com/en-us/story/19-women-on-what-its-like-to-receive-dick-pics [https:// 
perma.cc/Z3KR-4JMW] (providing testimonials from women who have received unsolicited sexually 
explicit images and how some believe it is normal). 
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Texas Penal Code Section 21.19 now gives women the power to report 
and possibly punish the senders of this visual material,236 but some women 
may not want the backlash from reporting it, or they simply would rather 
block the sender than go through the process of reporting the incident and 
further cooperating with law enforcement, which can be tedious and costly 
for the recipient.237  This process can include having the victim file a police 
report, continual communication with the district attorney’s office, and 
possibly testifying in the trial if the proceedings reach this stage without 
being previously terminated.238  Since TPC Section 21.19 is one of the first 
state laws to criminalize sending unsolicited sexually explicit images without 
some kind of “intent to harm or harass” element, there is no telling how 
many recipients of these messages will come forward and want to press 
charges, especially after a first occurrence with a particular person.  
Although some recognize there are obstacles to overcome in order to 
properly prosecute under the law, sponsors of the bill remain confident it 
will be worth passing it if it acts as a deterrent to this behavior.239 
V.    TEXAS PENAL CODE SECTION 21.19 FILLS THE GAP FOR DIGITAL 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT  
A. Texas Penal Code Section 21.19 Compared to Texas’s Harassment Law 
1. Texas Penal Code Section 42.07 
Many states have their own harassment laws in which the criteria to 
prosecute under seems similar to the criteria necessary to prosecute under 
TPC Section 21.19, including Texas.240  Texas’s harassment law, Penal 
 
236. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19. 
237. See Criminal Case Flow, BEXAR CNTY., https://www.bexar.org/DocumentCenter/ 
View/4487/Criminal-Case-Flow-Chart?bidId= [https://perma.cc/AZ97-VZ25] (providing a flow 
chart describing the steps of a criminal case). 
238. See id. (listing the steps of a criminal case). 
239. See Closson, supra note 22 (quoting Rep. Morgan Meyer, the author of the legislation: “‘We 
understand that enforcement will be a challenge,’ . . . ‘but this bill is intended to serve as a deterrent as 
well.  It’s keeping people aware that sending unsolicited lewd photos will not be tolerated . . . and 
stopping them from doing it in the first place’”). 
240. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2(a)(4)(B) (West 2019) (“A person who, with intent 
to harass . . . uses a computer network . . . or other form of electronic communication to: 
(A) communicate with a person; or (B) transmit an obscene message or indecent or profane words to 
a person.”), and  PENAL CODE § 42.07(a)(1) (“(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to harass, 
annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another, the person: (1) initiates communication and in the 
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Code Section 42.07, makes it a crime if, “with intent to harass, annoy, alarm, 
abuse, torment, or embarrass another, the person: (1) initiates 
communication and in the course of the communication makes a comment, 
request, suggestion, or proposal that is obscene.”241  This harassment law 
has similarities but differs from TPC Section 21.19, which criminalizes the 
simple act of knowingly sending certain sexual visual material without the 
recipient’s request or express consent.242   
One could argue TPC Section 21.19 is easier to prosecute under because 
it is not necessary to prove a certain state of mind for the sender, only that 
the visual material was not requested nor expressly consented to.  This is 
unlike Texas’s Penal Code Section 42.07, which requires the offender to 
have had intended to “harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass 
another” when sending it.243  Under Section 42.07, receiving one piece of 
the obscene visual material described might not be enough to get a 
conviction if the sender claims it was to propose a genuine activity.244  This 
is different from TPC Section 21.19 because the sender of the visual material 
can be prosecuted after sending it for the first time, even if the sender was 
genuine and thought the recipient would appreciate the gesture.245  The 
“intent” element in Section 42.07 allows the recipient to press charges 
against the sender only when the circumstances and evidence prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the “intent” element is indeed met.246  Intent 
inherently requires more evidence than the lack of request or express 
consent of the recipient, which prevents an influx of lawsuits and gives law 
enforcement more information based on circumstantial and direct evidence 
provided by the recipient in determining whether the case can be tried in 
court successfully.   
Section 42.07 also differentiates from TPC Section 21.19 by criminalizing 
obscene material, defining “obscene” within the statute as “containing a 
patently offensive description of or a solicitation to commit an ultimate sex 
act, including sexual intercourse, masturbation, cunnilingus, fellatio, or 
 
course of the communication makes a comment, request, suggestion, or proposal that is obscene.”), 
with PENAL CODE § 21.19 (H.B. 2789) (explicitly excluding an “intent” requirement). 
241. PENAL CODE § 42.07(a)(1). 
242. Id. § 21.19. 
243. Id. § 42.07(a). 
244. Id.  
245. Id. § 21.19. 
246. Id. § 42.07(a). 
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anilingus, or a description of an excretory function.”247  This definition is 
far more narrow than what is punishable under TPC Section 21.19.248  
Additionally, there is an “intent” requirement under Section 42.07 and it is 
one of seven punishable offenses under the Harassment law.249  Because 
of this, Section 42.07 is impeded from becoming a significant deterrent and 
symbol against the normalization of sending unsolicited sexual visual 
material.  Texas Penal Code Section 21.19 is a major symbol and direct 
stance against indecent online exposure in a time of desperate need. 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
When enacting a statute in Texas, it is presumed to comply with the Texas 
and United States Constitution.250  “The Texas Supreme Court has thereby 
held that when it is faced with multiple constructions of a statute, the court 
must interpret the statutory language in a manner that renders it 
constitutional, if possible to do so.”251  Further, if only a portion of the 
statute is invalid, without an expression of legislative intent regarding 
severability, “the valid remaining portions of a statute remain enforceable 
so long as the invalidity of one portion does not affect the other provisions 
or applications of the statute that can be given effect without the invalid 
provision or application.”252  If the unconstitutional parts of the statute are 
not so “inextricably interwoven in the texture” of the statute, the remainder 
of the statute is considered constitutional.253   
Texas Penal Code Section 21.19’s largest flaw is its wording; the 
advocates for the bill had good intentions and could have found a 
constitutional way to prevent online indecent exposure, but failed to do so.  
An image of a person’s “intimate parts exposed” is not automatically 
unprotected speech under the Constitution and is used too broadly in this 
context to be considered constitutional.  If a person sent their co-worker an 
image of their naked newborn’s buttocks without express consent or a 
request for the image, hoping to share joy for the birth of their child, they 
are breaking the law under TPC Section 21.19, punishable as a Class C 
 
247. Id. § 42.07(b)(3). 
248. Id. § 21.19(b)(1). 
249. Id. § 42.07. 
250. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.021(1). 
251. Ron Beal, The Art of Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 342, 428 (2012). 
252. Id. at 429.  
253. Fletcher v. State, 439 S.W.2d 656, 659 (1969). 
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misdemeanor254 and a maximum fine of $500.  This substantial oversight 
could have and should have been avoided by completing a more thorough 
reading of the bill and evaluating each section, including the three categories 
of material being regulated and how the bill will be applied in everyday life.   
The states can regulate obscenity because it is unprotected speech.255  If, 
when TPC Section 21.19 is applied, the “sexual conduct” transmitted 
encompasses the requirements of “obscenity,” this section of TPC 
Section 21.19 is constitutional as applied,256 but could be unconstitutional 
as applied if it is not obscene and is entitled to a higher level of protection, 
and the state failed to prove their burden of persuasion under either 
intermediate or strict scrutiny.257  Having one major component of TPC 
Section 21.19 being unconstitutional on its face, in addition to the concern 
of punishing sexual conduct that might not fit Texas’s standards of 
obscenity, leaves a bill that should not stand and should be rewritten more 
conscientiously.   
The protection TPC Section 21.19 promotes and advocates for is much 
needed because there is no current Texas law as potentially successful in 
deterring unsolicited sexually explicit visual material as much as one that can 
be used to prosecute a sender of the material after the very first time it is 
sent.  In the meantime, advocates for this needed law should promote 
Texas’s harassment law and provide Texans with the knowledge they need 
to report these incidents, gradually raising the awareness for online 
protection from indecent exposure until the Legislature introduces a 
constitutional version of TPC Section 21.19. 
 
 
254. PENAL CODE § 21.19(c). 
255. Obscenity, supra note 163 (“All fifty states have individual laws controlling obscene 
material.”). 
256. See Hudson Jr., As-applied Challenges, supra note 38 (“In as-applied challenges in First 
Amendment cases, litigants contend that a governmental law, rule, regulation, or policy is 
unconstitutional as applied to their expressive activities.”). 
257. See generally Steiner, supra note 3 (describing the levels of governmental scrutiny and what 
they entail). 
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